Lending to an Insecure Sovereign by Herschel I. Grossman




Working Paper No. 2443




I thank Seonghwan Oh and participants in the NBER/FMME 1987 Summer Institute for
useful comments on preliminary version of this paper. The research reported here
is part of the NBER's research program in Financial Markets and Monetary Economics.
Any opinions expressed are those of the author and not those of the National Bureau
of Economic Research.NBE Working Paper #2443
November1987
Lendingto an Insecure Sovereign
ABSTRACT
Thispaper analyzes a reputational equilibrium forsovereign debtina model inwhich the sovereignborrows to finance
spendingfor defense against threats to its survival in power.
In this model, the amount of sovereign debt and defense spending,
the resulting survival probability, and the sovereign's implied
discount rate for future consumption are determined
simultaneously. The optimal amount of debt and defense spending
equates the marginal cost of defense spending in reducing the
level of consumption to the marginal benefit of defense spending
in increasing the probability of surviving to enjoy future
consumption. In the reputational equilibrium, however, the
amount of debt and the associated discount rate must be small
enough that the short—run gains from debt repudiation are not
larger than the long—run costs from the loss of a trustworthy
reputation.
The analysis shows that the interest rate on the sovereign's
debt and the discount rate for the sovereign that results from
optimal borrowing and defense spending can be small enough that
optimal borrowing and defense spending satisfy the condition for
a reputational equilibrium. In this case, the sovereign's
inability to make an irrevocable commitment not to repudiate its
debts does not hinder its ability to finance its defense against
threats to its survival. This result is more likely to obtain
the smaller is the expected rate of return that lenders require,
the larger is the amount of servicing that a potential successor
sovereign would rationally provide for debts incurred by the
current sovereign, and the closer is the relation between the





Providence, RI 02912A distinguishing feature of sovereignty is the power to
abrogate commitments without having to answer to a higher legal
authority. In particular, the debts of a sovereign, unlike
private debts, are not subject to laws regarding bankruptcy and
enforcement of collateral. These observations suggest that a
sovereign's decision not to repudiate its current debts depends
primarily on the sovereign's concern about its reputation——that
is, about the effect of this decision on lender expectations
about future repudiation, which in turn determine the sovereign's
continued access to loans.
In recent papers, Grossman & Van E-luyck (January 1987, August
1987), we have analyzed reputational equilibria for sovereign
debts. In a reputational equilibrium, the short—run benefits
from repudiation are smaller than the long—run costs from the
loss of a trustworthy reputation. This equilibrium condition can
allow positive sovereign debt, but also can imply a limitation on
sovereign borrowing that is smaller than the amount that the
sovereign would borrow if it could make an irrevocable commitment
not to repudiate.
A key factor in determining the amount of debt that
reputational considerations can support is the rate at which the
sovereign discounts the benefits of future borrowing. If the
sovereign discounts the future heavily, then it has little
concern for its reputation and lenders could not lend even a
small amount to the sovereign without inducing repudiation. At
the other extreme, if the sovereign puts a high enough value on
its ability to borrow in the future, then reputational
considerations can substitute fully for the sovereign's inability
to make irrevocable commitments.
The sovereign's discount rate presumably depends mainly, if
not solely, on its probability of surviving in power. Previous—2—
analysesof reputational equilibria have treated the discount
rate,and by implication the sovereign's survival probability, as
exogenous. This assumption abstracts from the effect, which may
well be important, that the sovereign's reputation and its
consequent ability to borrow (or to engage in other actions, such
as the collection of seigniorage, that depend on its reputation)
have on its survival probability.
The present paper analyzes a reputational equilibrium for a
model in which the sovereign borrows in order to finance its
defense against threats to its survival. In this equilibrium, in
contrast to previous analyses, the sovereign's ability to borrow
and its discount rate are determined simultaneously.
1. Analytical Framework
The sovereign's objective in issuing debt in period r is
to maximize U, which is the expected sum of future consumption
over an horizon of h periods——that is,
T+h
(1) U =E:tT+l
where Ct is consumption in period t. One interpretation of
this objective is that the sovereign is Pigovian and that c
measures the total consumption of the sovereign's subjects. An
alternative interpretation is that the sovereign acts as a
proprietor and that ct measures the consumption of the
sovereign's court, which in modern states would include the
entire political establishment or ruling group that extracts the
rents associated with the existing sovereignty. The analysis is
robust to these alternative interpretations of the sovereign's
objective.In any event, these two measures of consumption are
likely to be highly correlated. The assumptions implicit in—3—
equation (1) that utility is linear in consumption and that the
sovereign does not discount future consumption that occurs either
before or in period t+h are convenient simplications.
The horizon h corresponds to the prospective longevity of
the sovereign's survival in power. The analysis assumes that
h is a random variable defined over the non—negative integers.
The probability that the sovereignty, having survived to period
t, will not survive to period t+1 is where
o ÷1 1.In other words, the realization of h is derived
from a stochastic process with the property
Pr (h =t+llht) =1—
Giventhis stochastic process, and given that h is the
only stochastic element in the model, calculation of the
expectation in equation (1) yields a discounted sum of
consumption over an infinite horizon——namely,
(2) Ut = +
Tt+l1t+2 r+2 + T+1YT+2IT+3cT+3 +
Accordingly to equation (2), the contribution of consumption in
any future period to Uis larger the larger is the probability
that the sovereignty will survive to that period.
The essential innovation in the present analysis is that it
treats the probability that the current sovereignty will
survive from period tto period t+1 as endogenous.
Specifically, this probability depends on the amount that the
sovereign spends in period t on defense against threats to its
survival. These threats can involve the possibility of conquest
by external aggressors or the possibility of insurrection and
overthrow by internal rivals.—4—
Spending on defense, denoted by bti is measured as a
fraction of gross income per period available to the sovereign.
The analysis assumes that a positive survival probability
requires positive defense spending and that increases
with bt at a decreasing rate——that is,
=f(b),with f(O) =0,f(l) =1,f' > 0, f" < 0.
Equation (3) implies a fixed relation between and bt.
Also, to focus on the role of sovereign debt in determining the
sovereign's probability of surviving, the analysis assumes that
all defense spending must be financed by borrowing. [Useful
extensions of the analysis would allow the intensity of threats
to survival and the resulting relation between the survival
probability and defense spending to vary over time and also would
allow the sovereign to choose a combination of borrowing and self
finance for defense spendingj In addition, the present analysis
abstracts from other motivations for borrowing emphasized in
previous studies——namely, productive investment and risk
shifting.
If the sovereign survives from period t to period t÷l,
its consumption in period t+l equals its gross income, y,
minus the amount it spends in period t+l to service
debts issued to finance previous defense spending——that is,
(4) c+1 =y—s1for t =r+l,...,t+h.
In this context, corresponding to the alternative interpretations
of ct, y can represent either the gross income of the
sovereign's subjects or the gross rents extracted by the ruling
group. The simplifying assumption that y is constant is
consistent with the simplifying assumption that the sovereign—5—
borrows only to finance defense spending, and not to finance
productive investments or to shift risk.
The final simplifying assumptions are that the sovereign's
debts all mature in one period, that the sovereign's lenders, are
atomistic, and that market clearing implies that the expected
rate of return on sovereign debt equals a fixed required expected
rate of return,p. Let Se(b) be the amount of debt servicing
that lenders in period t expect to receive in period t+l from
the current sovereign if the current sovereign survives to
period t+l and let Ne(b) be the amount of debt servicing
that lenders expect to receive in period t+l from a new
sovereign if the current sovereign does not survive. Then the
market—clearing condition for sovereign debt implies that bt,
and Ne(b) satisfy
1t+l Se(b) + (l_1+l)Ne(b) =(l+)by.
e The next step is to consider the determination of S (bt)
and Ne(b). In general, it seems reasonable to assume that
(6) Ne(b) Se(bt).
Condition (6) says that lenders never expect to receive more
servicing of the current sovereign's debts from a successor
sovereign than they expect to receive from the current
sovereign. This assumption rules out the paradoxical possibility
that lenders to the current sovereign would prefer that the
current sovereign not survive.—6—
2. An Irrevocable Servicing Commitment
Suppose, hypothetically, that in period t the sovereign
could irrevocably commit itself, as well as its potential
successors, to service its debts in full ——thatis, to follow in
period t+l the debt servicing policy given by
=(l+Rt)bty,
where Rt is the contractual interest rate on the sovereign's
debt. This irrevocable servicing commitment would determine the
lenders' expectation about debt servicing to be
(8) Se(b) =Ne(b)
=(l+Rt)bty.
For equation (8) to be consistent with equation (5) ——thatis,
for the expected return to lenders to equal the required expected
rate of return p ——thecontractual interest rate Rt must
equal p.
If it could make such an irrevocable servicing commitment,
the sovereign could issue any amount of debt that it chooses as
long as it offers this contractual interest rate. Accordingly,
the sovereign would choose bto maximize Uas given by
equation (2), subject to the constraints given by equations (3),
(4), (7), and Rt =p.The sovereign would also know that, if
it survives, it would face the identical problem in choosing
b÷1, b+2, etc. Thus, the sovereign's problem is equivalent to
the problem of choosing a constant amount of defense expenditures
and debt, denoted by b,to maximize
(9) U =
T:Y:2,subjectto
(10) =f(b),c =y—s,ands =(l+p)by.—7—
The critical value for this problem, denoted by b,
satisfies the first—order condition dU/db =0,which implies
'ii' ci-'. + - / L\JJ d 1—f
—
wheredc/db =—(l+p)and =y—(1+p)by.
2 2 The relevant second—order condition, d U/db < 0, is
unambiguously satisfied. Equation (11) says that the optimal
amount of debt and defense spending, b, equates the marginal
cost of defense spending in reducing the level of consumption to
the marginal benefit of defense spending in increasing the
probability of surviving to enjoy future consumption. The
implied values '= f(s)and are the optimal survival
probability and the optimal level of consumption.
3. A Reputational Equilibrium
In reality, a sovereign, not being subject to higher legal
authority, cannot irrevocably commit itself, or its potential
successors, not to repudiate its debts. Consequently, lenders
must limit the amount of sovereign debt such that the sovereign,
taking account of the benefits and costs associated with
repudiation, would not find repudiation to be a desirable
policy. Because, for any positive amount of debt, repudiation
has the benefit of increasing current consumption, an equilibrium
with a positive amount of debt requires that repudiation would
imply an offsetting cost in the form of a reduction in expected
future consumption. Specifically, an equilibrium with a positive
amount of debt requires that, given the interest rate on this
debt, the expected value of the sovereign's consumption is at
least as large if the sovereign services its debts in full as it
would be if the sovereign were to repudiate its debts.—8—
In a reputational model of sovereign debt, the sovereign's
current and past debt servicing decisions and its future
consumption opportunities are linked through its reputation for
trustworthiness. Specifically, lenders base their expectations
about the sovereign's future debt servicing on the sovereign's
current and past record of debt servicing. Given this linkage, a
rational sovereign would consider how its current debt servicing
is likely to affect its reputation and how its reputation affects
ts ability to issue debt now and in the future. [Assuming that
che process by which it appoints and removes individual
policymakers permits the sovereign to translate its objectives
into policy, reputation resides with the sovereign and not with
individual policymakers.]
In a reputational equilibrium, the amount of debt and the
interest rate are such that only a sovereign that irrationally
ignored its reputation would behave opportunistically and
repudiate its debts. Using their knowledge and of how
repudiation would affect a sovereign's reputation, lenders are
able to calculate the maximum amount of debt servicing that the
current sovereign and potential successor sovereigns rationally
would choose to provide. Given the stationary structure of the
model, these amounts, denoted Sandn, are time invariant.
Together with the market—clearing condition for sovereign debt,
and iTimplya time—invariant maximum amount of debt, denoted
,thatthe current sovereign can issue it it has a trustworthy
reputation. Specifically, from equations (3) and (5), the
sovereign faces the constraint
(12) bt b,
where b satisfies f(b)s +[l—f(b)]n=(1+p)y.—9—
To analyze the determination of the cUrrent sovereign's
reputation, assume that all sovereigns always behave rationally,
except for an infinitesimal fraction, c, of sovereigns who
inexplicably lose the rational ability to resist the temptation
to behave opportunistically. A loss of rational restraintcould
result either from idiosyncratic irrationality or from a
breakdown in the process by which the individuals who compose the
sovereignty reach their decisions. Either infirmity, however
'ricommonly it occurs, is intrinsic and irreversible.
Knowing this pattern of sovereign behavior, lenders, when
dealing with a specific sovereign, attach probability l—E,
which equals approximately unity, to rational and, hence,
trustworthy behavior as long as this sovereign has not behaved
opportunistically in the past. For the current sovereign,
rational behavior implies full servicing ot debts that it has
incurred or that its predecessor sovereigns incurred up to the
maximum amount of servicing S.Witha trustworthy reputation,
the current sovereign can issue debt up to the amount b.
If, alternatively, a sovereign ever has failed to exercise
rational restraint, lenders would expect such opportunistic
behavior by this sovereign in the future. In this case, Se(b)
would equal zero and by condition (6) Ne(b) would also equal
zero. Thus, the market—clearing condition would imply that this
sovereign would be unable to issue any debt. Note that this
outcome would depend only on the expectations of atomistic
lenders and would not require or involve collusive strategic
behavior by lenders.[This analysis assumes for simplicity that
lenders never forget a past repudiation and, hence, that a
sovereign could never recover a trustworthy reputation once it
had been lost. See Grossman & Van Huyck (January 1987, May 1987)
for a more general model ot the lenders' memory process.]— 10—
Tosummarize, if lenders in period T expect the current
sovereign to behave rationally ——thatis, if in all periods from
the inception of its sovereignty through tthe current
sovereign has serviced existing debts, whether incurred by itself
in its predecessors, in full up to the amount ——andif
lenders expect that a successor sovereign would behave
rationally, then lenders' expectations are
(13) for t =TcSe(b) =(1+Rt)bty s
and Ne(b) =min[(1+R)by,n]and
for t+ht > T, either Se(b) =(1+Rt)bty
and Ne(b) =min[(1+Rt)bty,fl
f =Se(b.l)for allj =0,..,,t—r—l,
orse(b)Ne(b)0 otherwise.
In addition, if the sovereign has a trustworthy reputation and,
hence, is able to issue a positive amount of debt, then the
contractual interest rate, Rt, must imply an expected return to
lenders equal to the required expected rate of return p. In
other words, condition (13) must be consistent with equation (5),
which implies that Rt must satisfy
(14) 1+Rt = 1+p
t+l '+) min[1, n/(1+Rt)bty]
where, from equation =— 11—
Equation(14) implies that, with less than unity, Rt
exceeds pif and only if n is less than (1+Rt)bty ——that
is, if and only if a new sovereign, who has a positive
probability of replacing the current sovereign, would not
rationally service the current sovereign's debts in full.
Taking account of reputation, the rational sovereign's
problem in period ris to choose a program (b) to
maximize U, as given by equation (2), subject to equations
(3), (4), (6), and (14) and conditions (12) and (13). The
solution to this problem describes a reputational equilibrium.
Given the stationary structure of the model, this program,
denoted by b*, is time invariant.
To derive b*, define V1 to be the sum, given that the
sovereign has survived to period t+l, of consumption in
period t+1 and the expectation formed in period 'r+l of total
consumption in periods T+2 through -r+h ——thatis,
T+h
(15) V=c +E c. t+l T+l T+l t
Given the stochastic process generating h, equation (15)
implies
(16) c+1 + 11+2c1+2 + T+21T+3 T+3 +
Condition (12) implies that b* is less than or equal to
and, hence, is a member of the set of amounts of debt that
satisfy
(17) V°,— 12—
whereV' is the value of V that results from borrowing T+l t+l
b* and servicing this debt in full in every period from r+l
through r+h and V0 is the value of V that would result T+l T+l
from borrowing b* is period rand repudiating this debt in
period r+l. Condition (17) says that b* is such that a plan
that for all tT+l involves servicing this debt in full would
generate in period T+l at least as high expected utility for a
rational sovereign as would a decision to repudiate. If b*
equals 6,thencondition (17) is satisfied as an equality.
If b* is less than ,thencondition (17) is satisfied as an
inequality.
Given that, if the sovereign services its debt in full,
lenders do not change their expectations, any value of b* that
satisfies condition (17) also satisfies the analogous condition
for period t+l and, by extension, for every subsequent
period. Therefore, the sovereign's plan to keep its trustworthy
reputation in the future is time consistent.
Equation (16) implies that
(18) V÷ =
where,from equations (3), (4), (7), and (14), we have
1* =f(b*),c* =y—s,s =(1+R*)b*y,
and 1+R* =
1
y* +(l—y)min(l, n/s*)— 13—
Tocalculate V°÷i, observe that by repudiating its debts in
period T+l the sovereign would be able to consume all ofy in
that period, but would be unable to borrow again and, hence,
would have no chance to survive beyond period T+l. Thus, we
have
(19) v°1
4. Does Reputation Support Optimal Defense Spending?
The analysis in Section 2 derived the optimal amount of debt
and defense spending, B,whichwould equate the marginal cost
and marginal benefit of defense spending and would yield the
highest value of Usubject to the constraint of full debt
servicing. Thus, if condition (17) is satisfied for b* equal
to B—— thatis, if Bisnot larger than b ——thenthe
sovereign would borrow b, and b is the reputational
equilibrium. If, alternatively, condition (17) is not satisfied
for b* equal to B,lenderswould not permit the sovereign to
borrow B.Sucha constraint would prevent the sovereign from
achieving both optimal defense spending and an optimal survival
probability.
To determine whether b is the reputational equilibrium, it
is necessary to evaluate condition (17) for b* equal to b. To
facilitate the analysis, assume that f(b) =b,0 < a < 1. With
this assumption, condition (17) and equations (18) and (19) imply
that b* satisfies the condition
1
(20) b* (1+R*)i—a— 14—
where l+R* = — 1*=(b*)a,
+(1-y)min(l, n/s*)
and s =(i+R*)b*y.
Moreover, the derivative of U with respect to b, calculated
from equations (9) and (10), becomes
(21) dU=baY{—(l+p) +a[l—(l+p)b}
lba b(l_ba)
Now suppose that s is not greater than n, which means
that lenders calculate that it would be rational for a successor
sovereign to service fully the debts incurred by the current




Suppose also thatp and a are not too large. Specifically,
assume that
1.
In this case, equation (21) implies that, if b were equal to
E,dU/dbwould be negative. But, condition (11), which
determines £,setsdU/db equal to zero. Thus, the critical
value, b, is less than b. Accordingly, in this case, b*
equals b.— 15—
Inthe figure, the locus labelled, depicts the problem
given by equations (9) and (10), whose solution is b, whereas
the locus labelled -j---- depicts the borrowing constraints in the
reputatiorial equilibrium. The solid segment of this locus
indicates the set of values of b that satisfy condition (17).










Theassumption that s is not greater than i,ofcourse,
seems unduly restrictive. In general, we want to consider values
of 1ilessthan s and even the possibility that n equals
zero, which would mean that lenders expect that a new sovereign
would repudiate the debts of the current sovereign. A val'ue of
less than s would imply that any given value of b* would
require a higher contractual interest rate, R*. This change, in
turn, would imply lower value for i.Asn approaches zero,
the condition would be satisfied only for lower and lower
values of pand a.
It would also be interesting to consider the possibility
that the current sovereign's discount rate does not depend only
on its probability of surviving in power. Specifically, suppose
that the current sovereign exhibits pure time preference and,
hence, would discount the future even if it were certain to
survive in power forever. Pure time preference would imply lower
values for both Bandi.Whetherthe condition would
be satisfied for high enough values of pure time preference does
not seem to be clear.
5. Summary
This paper analyzes a reputational equilibrium for sovereign
debt in a model in which the sovereign borrows to finance
spending for defense against threats to its survival in power.
In this model, the amount of sovereign debt and defense spending,
the resulting survival probability, and the sovereign's implied
discount rate for future consumption are determined
simultaneously. The optimal amount of debt and defense spending
equates the marginal cost of defense spending in reducing the
level of consumption to the marginal benefit of defense spending
in increasing the probability of surviving to enjoy future— 17
consumption. In the reputational equilibrium, however, the
amount of debt and the associated discount rate must he small
enough that the short—run gains from debt repudiation are not
larger than the long—run costs from the loss of a trustworthy
reputation.
The analysis shows that the interest rate on the sovereign's
debt and the discount rate for the sovereign that results from
optimal borrowing and defense spending can be small enough that
optimal borrowing and defense spending satisfy the condition for
a reputational equilibrium. In this case, the sovereign's
inability to make an irrevocable commitment not to repudiate its
debts does not hinder its ability to finance its defense against
threats to its survival. This result is more likely to obtain
the smaller is the expected rate of return that lenders require,
the larger is the amount of servicing that a potential successor
sovereign would rationally provide for debts incurred by the
current sovereign, and the closer is the relation between the
current sovereign's discount rate and its probability of
surviving in power.— 18—
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